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of Utah, as evidenced by the Utah Rules of Civi 1 Procedure, 
adopted by this Court, 
RULE!-, ''f HKGUI./VI 'UN!: 
Following is the pertinent text of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. and 
Rule A71-07-l:7(111)(C) of the Rules and Regulations of the 
Department of Employment Security: 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated instrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule A71-Q7-l:7 (iii) (c) Rules and Regulations of the 
Department of Employment Security: 
All base period employers and all employers for which a 
claimant worked after the base period, but prior to 
when the claim is filed, shall be notified prior to the 
payment of benefits that a claim has been filed. All 
employees who receive this notice may protest payment 
of benefits to former employees and all contributing 
employers may request relief of charges. All such 
protests and requests must be made in writing to the 
Department within ten days after the notice is issued 
2 
and must state in detail the circumstances which are 
alleged by the employer to justify a denial of benefits 
to the claimant, or relief of charges to the employer. 
If the basis for the request of relief of charges would 
have justified such relief, but the employer fails to 
provide separation information within the time limits 
of the request or make a timely protest, such charges 
may not be considered erroneous charges from which the 
employer can later be relieved. An exception may be 
allowed for an untimely protest upon a showing of good 
cause. Good cause for failing to file a timely protest 
will be established in accordance with guidelines for 
late filing of other appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is an employer, with his principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County. On July 26, 1985, a former 
employee, Kathryn F. Preece, filed a claim for unemployment 
insurance, claiming that she was wrongfully discharged. In 
late July, the employer received a Notice of Claim and 
Eligibility, and employer charges (R36), dated July 21, 1985. 
This notice was received by the employer, despite the fact that 
it had been mailed to the wrong address. Unfortunately, 
despite the fact that the Notice of Claim and Eligibility was 
received (on a "hit and miss" basis), the earlier request for 
additional information regarding the reason for the discharge 
was not received by the employer, and could not have been 
responded to. After much additional correspondence, the 
Department agreed to set aside the eligibility notice and to 
correspond through counsel, to avoid continuing communication 
problems. The lost communication from the Department was not 
the first item mailed by the Department to the wrong address 
and lost. See R. 36 - 39. The Department once again sent out 
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a written request for information regarding the termination of 
this employee on December 18f 1985. Due to the fact that it 
had to be routed through counsel, due to the unsettled nature 
of the Christmas season, and due to what the employer claims 
was excusable inadvertence, the request was overlooked for a 
period of time, but was filled out by the employer, and 
returned on January 26, 1986, (R62). Apparently, on or about 
January 28, 1986, a decision was mailed, in which Ms. Preece 
was once again awarded unemployment insurance, to be charged to 
the employer's benefit ratio account, based in part on the 
Department's refusal to consider the employer's objections, 
despite the fact that they had been received prior to the 
decision. The employer's objections were substantial, claiming 
that the employee was discharged because of illegal drug usage 
and prostitution activities. No copy of that mailing from the 
Department can be found in either the records of the employer, 
or in the records of this case. At any rate, an appeal of that 
decision was sent on January 30, 1986, and received by the 
Department on February 6, 1986, (R60). On February 1, 1986, 
the Administrative Law Judge sent a notice of hearing, 
informing the employer that, on March 3, 1986, a hearing would 
be held on the following items: 
A) Whether the Claimant was discharged for just 
cause, or an action or omission in connection with 
employment, which was deliberate, willful, or wanton, 
and adverse to the employer's rightful interest; 
B) Whether the Claimant, by reason of his/her 
4 
fault, received any sums of benefits to which he/she 
was not entitled and must repay; 
C) Whether the employer is eligible for release 
of charges. 
D) Whether the Claimant, through no fault of her 
own, received benefits to which she was not entitled 
(R58). | 
Unfortunately, the actual hearing did not get to any of 
these issues, as the Administrative Law Judge decided there was 
not "good cause" for not filing the timely protest, thus 
rendering all other issues moot (R55). The Administrative Law 
Judge, in his formal written ruling, first cited the rule of 
the Department of Employment Security, Regarding relief from 
charges, which is cited above. He then made the following 
statement: 
In the present case, the employer failed to file a 
timely request for relief of charges. Not only did he 
fail to file a written protest within the ten day 
period, but delayed another twenty-two days. The 
Notice of Potential Benefit Costs was mailed to the 
address requested by the employer, and the employer has 
failed to show that the delay in filing a written 
request was due to circumstances beyond his control, or 
due to circumstances which were reasonable and 
compelling. It is noted, when the employer withdrew 
his appeal from an audit determination, that he was 
given another opportunity to request relief of charges, 
and knew, or should have known, that this request would 
be forthcoming. Yet the employer failed to act upon 
the request in a timely manner. It must be held that 
the employer failed without good cause to file a timely 
request for relief of charges. 
Despite an affidavit stating in more detail the 
"inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" which resulted in the 
filing of the late protest (R33-34), the Board of Review upheld 
the Administrative Law Judge by written decision of April 8, 
5 
1986 (R23) without comment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff herein claims that it has shown sufficient 
grounds, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases 
construing that rule, to have the judgment against it set aside 
based on "inadvertence or excusable neglect", and to have its 
day of court, in the court in which its objects are to be 
heard. Plaintiff admits the existence of a rule followed by 
the Department of Employment Security, which appears to give a 
different standard for setting aside judgments than is 
promulgated under the Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent 
that this rule raises the standard for setting aside judgments, 
Plaintiff contends that the rule is null and void as a 
violation of public policy of the State of Utah. Plaintiff 
also contends that the State of Utah has not entered this case 
with "clean hands." Because of their continued refusal to 
communicate with Plaintiff at its correct address, it became 
necessary to insist that communication be made through 
Plaintiff's counsel. Unfortunately, in this instance, that 
extra step appears to have contributed to a communication 
problem, in which Plaintiff did not provide requested 
information within the time requested for it. The Department's 
refusal to admit its own fault in the case, and to grant 
Plaintiff some additional time because of that fault, amounts 
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to an arbitrary and capricious denial of Plaintiff's day in 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
RULE A71-07-l:7(lll)(C) OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH REGARDING 
SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS, AND SO IS NULL AND VOID; OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE INTERPRETATION OF THAT RULE 
RELIED UPON BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW IS UNDULY RESTRICTIVE, AND SO IS NULL 
AND VOID. 
The standard of relief from a judgment in the courts of 
this State, which is entered as a result of a party's failure 
to timely plead, is contained in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. That rule authorizes a court "upon such 
terms as are just" to: 
Relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . 
Plaintiff, in this matter, testified in front of the 
Administrative Law Judge that his failure to file objections 
within ten days, as requested, was due to inadvertence, in that 
he simply did not see the form that had been sent to him by 
counsel until after the deadline had passed. As soon as he saw 
it, he filled it out, and returned it (R54). That testimony 
was supported by later affidavit, as stated above. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that "the employer has failed to 
show that the delay in filing a written request was due to 
7 
circumstances bsx&Ilsl-hlssSilL.-tXPl, or due to circumstances which 
were reasonable and ££jpp£l.liiicj." Thus, the standard (the 
Department rule as interpeted) used by the Administrative Law 
Judge was far from the standard used by the courts, and 
approved by this Court. 
The standard for setting aside judgments in civil 
proceedings has evolved into a two-pronged test: the first 
question is whether, from the facts surrounding the failure to 
timely plead, a showing has been made of inadvertence or 
excusable neglect such that it would be "just"; and, whether it 
appears the defaulted party has a meritorious defense. The 
first part of this test is illustrated in the case of 
ln££I$££££-EZ££Xa£±n^2*-l&l£-DS}l3lQ£m£nSr* 611 P. 2d 369 (Utah, 
1980). The Court therein stated the policy of the law: 
The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law is to 
accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the 
merits, where that can be done without serious 
injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts 
are generally indulgent toward the setting aside of 
default judgments where there is a reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to 
appear, and where timely application is made to set it 
aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, 
where there is doubt about whether a default should be 
set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of 
doing so, to the end that each party may have an 
opportunity to present his side of the controversy, and 
that there can be a resolution in accordance with law 
and justice. 611 P.2d at 371. 
Even the dissent in that case, while disagreeing about 
overruling the lower court and setting aside the particular 
judgment involved, stated: 
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It is not to be questioned that the policy of the law 
favors the granting of such relief in the case of a 
default judgment, and that the remedy should be 
liberally administered in order to grant the defaulting 
party his day in court. 611 P.2d at 371-2. 
Very simply put, the standard applied by • the 
Administrative Law Judgef as he understood it, and as was 
upheld by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 
strongly favors default judgments, and is strongly resistent to 
their being set aside. To that extent, the rule of the 
Department, and the application of that rule in this case, is 
clearly contrary to "the uniformly acknowledged policy of the 
law." Plaintiff challenges the Department of Employment 
Security to show any hardship or injustice v/hatsoever that 
might possibly result to them if this default judgment were set 
aside. Plaintiff acknowledges the concurrent line of 
authority, cited by the dissent in the Iiit£j££££.g_E£££x&tinc} 
case, to the effect "that such judicial policy remains co-
existent with the broad latitude of discretion accorded the 
trial court in ruling upon such motions." 611 P.2d at 372; see 
also M¥k3$-3*-S£>£M&X&-£ll££ni£S-.£2jLt 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 
951 (Utah, 1962). Obviously, that discretion is to be 
exercised only within the policy of the law. Where the 
Administrative Law Judge in this matter was laboring under a 
completely false illusion as to the public policy of this 
state, his discretion is utterly without basis. 
The California Court of Appeals was faced with a similar 
problem in JJlliJj^A—5JMJt£5-_EC£ial S3£Xi£S Y^ £ali£2I&i£ 
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Sl&I&l£Xl^I&^X&UI3Il££-AB2£a±&-&£&X&i 63 Cal. App. 3d 506, 134 
Cal. Rptr. 19 (Cal. App.f 1976). In that case, the U.S. Postal 
Service had failed to file an appeal of referee's decision 
within the California Unemployment Insurance System within the 
ten days required by the department's rules. The postal 
service, in justification of its late filing, cited internal 
problems with an overworked legal staff. The Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board for the State of California also relied 
on a standard of "good cause" to excuse late filings. As in 
the instant case, the Board had adhered to a restrictive 
interpretation of "good cause." Referring to the argument of 
the Appeals Board, the Court stated: 
It suggests that the excuse should be disregarded 
because the error was committed by internal procedures 
of the postal service in communicating between one 
branch office and its employed legal staff, and because 
of its failure to provide adequate legal staff to 
handle its business. 
The Appeals Board points out that the purposes of the 
act will be frustrated if a determination of the 
eligibility for benefits is delayed by excusable 
neglect, as well as procrastination, by the employer. 
It suggests that to apply other than an arbitrary 
standard will promote applications for delay, or for 
relief from tardy filing, by employers. 134 Cal. Rptr. 
at 24. 
The Court went on to comment: 
The concept of good cause should not be enshrined in 
legal formalism; is calls for a factual exposition of a 
reasonable ground for the sought order. The good 
cause may be equated to a good reason for a party's 
failure to perform that specific requirement from which 
he seeks to be excused. (Citations omitted.) Section 
1256 makes it clear that every termination of 
employment is not accompanied by a right to 
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unemployment compensation. The employer1s interest in 
avoiding unwarranted liability may not equate with the 
legislative objective of reducing the hardship of 
employment. (Citations omitted.) Nevertheless, the 
case last cited indicates that the legislature did not 
intend that benefits should be paid when the Claimant 
was not entitled to them. (Citations omitted.) Here, 
in fact, the referee found that the claimant was not 
entitled to benefits. We see no necessity to approve a 
procedural rule which would facilitate the payment of 
unwarranted benefits. "Good cause" should be uniformly 
applied to the parties as the circumstances warrant. 
Such a rule is not a license for unwarranted delays by 
the employer. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 24. 
Plaintiff acknowledges the recent case of £££h3£Q US* 
BQSX& £>t BSXiSM Q£ HL&U£$rXi2l £SSWi££i2£, 111 P. 2d 712 (Utah 
1986) in which, while disapproving of the restrictive way in 
which the Board of Review applied its rule, the Court seemed to 
have approved of the "good cause" standard. Plaintiff submits 
that there was in that case no challenge to the standard 
itself. This Court has seemingly upheld a "good cause" 
standard for other aspects of unemployment insurance, such as 
whether the employee was discharged for "good cause". See 
QlbSQS X&. BSSlA i?i B32l£X £.£ HlAiiBtxial £&SUEli8sifiB, 707 P. 2d 
675 (Utah 1985). The Court has taken the position that the 
review of such a standard is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Plaintiff submits that, on either question of law or fact, it 
should prevail. The fact remains, however, that the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review in the instant 
case used a standard which is contrary to the policy of the 
law, as enunciated by this Court, and other courts. This is 
the appropriate opportunity for this Court to either change the 
11 
standard, or to re-interpret it so that similar problems will 
not continue, causing unnecessary reviews in this Court. 
This Court, in JS±3±£^ _^llllfiS£iJR3U# 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah, 
1983), ruled that: 
In order for Defendant to be relieved from the default 
judgment, he must not only show that the judgment was 
entered against him through excusable neglect (or any 
other reason specified in Rule 60 [b]), but he must also 
show that his motion to set aside the judgment was 
timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the 
action. 667 P.2d at 1055-6. 
Plaintiff's motion to the Administrative Law Judge was 
clearly timely. As stated above, it was with adequate cause 
under the law. The last question, therefore, is whether 
Plaintiff shows a meritorious defense. The Claimant for 
unemployment benefits claims that she was unjustly terminated 
from employment, because she would not fill in for someone else 
on their day off (R64). Plaintiff's objection shows a 
completely different view, and makes charges which obviously 
should have been gone into by the Department, before deciding 
whether to give the Claimant unemployment insurance. Plaintiff 
stated in its reply: 
Dismissed for prostitution believed to be going on; 
also because of the illegal use of drugs and not being 
able to stay awake at work. Also, she has been 
employed at Anatomy & Us from the 1st day of July until 
the first part of October (R62). 
Obviously, this meets the test enunciated in the EUS££l&&n 
case. Plaintiff claims that the employee was discharged for 
prostitution activities, and for drug use which affected her 
job performance. Plaintiff also claims that the former 
12 
employee was immediately employed by a rival massage 
establishment, thus making her ineligible for benefits and 
likely the perpetrator of a fraud upon the State of Utah. The 
failure of the Administrative Law Judge, and the Board of 
Review, to at least give Plaintiff its day to show the truth of 
these allegations, is astonishing. 
In the instant case, the employer admits that his problem 
in communicating with his attorney was an internal one. The 
Court is reminded that the State has already had its mistake, 
in sending papers to the wrong address, a problem that has been 
repeated between this employer and the Department on several 
occasions, despite repeated requests to correct the address. 
Plaintiff submits that the mistakes of the employer were, in 
part, caused by the mistakes of the Department. As in the 
California case, strict adherence to an arbitrary standard is 
likely to cause a substantial risk of someone receiving 
benefits to which they are not entitled. The Utah legislature 
no more intended that result than did the California 
legislature. I 
Therefore, Plaintiff asks the Court to find, in the 
alternative, that the standard promulgated by the rule in 
question is void as a matter of public policy, or that the 
restrictive interpretation exercised by the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Board of Appeals is in error, and should be 
overruled. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff requests this Court either to find that the 
standard of "good cause" employed by the Department of 
Employment Security in determining whether to set aside 
judgments or consider late objections, is invalid as contrary 
to the public policy of this state; or that the interpretation 
of the rule by the Administrative Law Judge, and affirmed by 
the Board of Review, is erroneous, thus subjecting Plaintiff to 
a higher standard than is appropriate in order to obtain its 
day in court. Plaintiff therefore requests the Court to 
reverse the ruling of the Board of Review, and order a hearing 
on the merits of Plaintiff's claims. In the alternative, 
Plaintiff requests that this Court instruct the Board of Review 
as to the appropriate standard to use in determining such 
questions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
those instructions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /_J_ day of July, 1986. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, JENSEN & IVINS 
U 0JL tK.cJLL 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH Jj 
Attorney for Plaintiff {] 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ; f day of July, 1986, I 
did mail four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Petitioner, postage prepaid, to the 
Department of Employment Security, P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah 84147. 
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ADDENDUM 
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BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Indus t r ia l Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
SMM/SC/WKF/cd 
KATHRYN F. PREECE 
S.S.A. No. 529 84 6739 
vs, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Case Kr 86-A-77C-C 
DEC]SIOK 
'• -. i r 
;r so 
Af ter careful considerat ion cf *r.e record a ' * testimony ' - the 
above-ent i t led matter, the Board of wev*e* f inds the decision v" the 
Administ rat ive Law Jufloe to be f a i r anc un; *ased ani supported by competent 
evidence and, there fo re , a f f i r r rs such dec 1 s ic 
Mini Spas, I n c . , l i a b l e for benef i t charges in connection * n r . : -
pursuant to §35-4-7(c) (3) ( f ) of the Utah Employment Se:urit> Act. 
ho ld ing , the Board of Review hereby adopts the f indings of fa r t ani e n . l e -
sion of 1o-< o* the decision of the Administrat ive t«i* ,! - ' J * 
This decision w i 1 - become f ina 1 *-•• n5v^ a f te* thf date o* making 
hereof, and any fu r ther appeal must be maoe d i rec t l y with the Utah Supreme 
Court at the State Capitol Bu i ld ing , SaU Lake C i t y , Utah, w i th in ten days 
af ter t h i s decision becomes f i n a l . To f i l e an appeal with the Supreme 
Court, ;* Hrust submit to the Clerk of the Cou^t a Pe t i t i on for w- i t of 
Review se t t ing fo r th the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-11 i i of 
the Utah Employment Security Act, fol lowed by a Docketing Statement and a 
Legal B r i e f . 
Date Mailed A ; r * ; 
0005 
? INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH 
Dur'ARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Kathryn F, 
1056 Wood 
Salt Lake 
Preece 
Ave • 
City, Utah 84105 
S.S.A. No. 529 84 6739 
Case No. 86-A-77Q 
Mini Spa's Inc. (Appellant) 
c/o W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney At Law 
930 South State, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
APPEAL FILED: February 4, 1986 DATE OF HEARING: March 3, 1986 
APPEARANCES: Claimant/Employer/ 
Employer's Attorney 
PLACE OF HEARING: Salt Lake City 
Telephone 
The Department's decision dated January 28, 1986 held the employer l iab le 
for benefit costs in connection with the claim in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment Security Act. This decision 
was based on the grounds that the employer fai led to submit a timely request for 
re l i e f of charges and did not show good cause for the late response. Section 
35-4-7(c) (3) (F) of the Utah Employment Security Act is quoted on the attached 
sheet. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
On December 9, 1985, the employer withdrew an appeal from an audit detennination 
dated May 29, 1984 which held the claimant, Kathryn F. Preece, performed services 
Min employment11. The employer withdrew their appeal with the understanding they 
would have an opportunity to contest benefits paid to the claimant and request 
re l i e f of charges for said benefits. 
As a result of the employer's withdrawal, the Department sent Form 607, Employer 
Notice of claim Filed and Potential Benefit Costs, to the employer. This was 
sent to the employer on December 18, 1985 and as requested by the employer i t 
was sent to the employer's attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, at 930 South State 
Street, Number 10, Orem, Utah 84058. This notice advised the employer potential 
benefit costs 1n the amount of $3,832.21 and stated "this is an o f f i c ia l notice 
that your pro-rated share of any benefits paid to this claimant wi l l be included 
in the determination of your benefit rat io tax rate for Calendar years beginning 
in 1985, unless you respond within ten days. Relief cannot be granted unless your 
request is submitted in writing by December 28, 1985. You wil l be noti f ied of the 
Department's decision with regard to any request". 
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The employer did not f i l e a request 1i r wr i t i n g un t i l January 20, 1986, They 
s ta te the delay may have been due to the fact the notice had to be forwarded 
from the attorney to the employer. However, the employer t e s t i f i e d he had the 
Notice of Potent ial Benef i t Costs for as long as ten days before act ing on i t . 
The em p 1 oy e r r e p o r t s 11 e c I a i m a n t I i a s b e e i i w o r k i n g w 1 11 1 e d r aw i n g u n e m p "1 oy me n t 
b e n e f i t s . The Department1 s Benefi t Payrnent Control Unit 1s presently looking 
In to t h i s matter. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF L AW: 
Rule A7 1-07-1 -ni 1 ' ' "l" i l ' I J i » II ,i i !h - , • i Il: Regt i l a I .v n is i :" I I i > DM -j n tii u M i I c d ' Emj l o y -
men t S e c u r i t y s*a**-s 
"A l l base period employers and a l l employers 1 "o? 
which a claimant worked af ter the base per iod, 
but p r io r to when the claim is f i l ed , , shall be 
n o t i f i e d p r io r to the payment of benef i ts tha t 
a claim has been f i l e d . A l l employees who re-
ceive th i s notice may protest payment of benef i ts 
to former employees and a l l contr ibut ing employers 
may request r e l i e f of charges. A l l such protests 
and requests must be made in w r i t i ng to the De-
partment w i th in ten days a f te r the notice i s 
issued and must state in deta i l the circum-
stances which are alleged by the employer to 
j u s t i f y a denial of benef i ts to the claimant, 
or r e l i e f of charges to the employer. I f the 
basis for the request of r e l i e f of charges 
would have j u s t i f i e d such r e l i e f , but the em-
ployer f a i l s to provide separation information 
wi th in the time l i m i t s of the request or make 
a t imely p ro tes t , .sudL^cl^j^r^^ 
^ l oye j ^ ^n^ la^ ru l i e ^ re l i eyeck An exception 
may be allowed for an untimely protest upon 
a showing of good cause. Good cause for 
f a i l i n g to f i l e a t imely protest w i l l be 
established in accordance wi th guidel ines 
for l a te f i l i n g of other appeals", 
In the present case, the employer f a i l ed to f i l e a timely request for r e l i e f of 
charges. Not only did he f a i l to f i l e a wr i t ten protest w i th in the ten day 
per iod , but delayed another twenty-two days. The Notice of Potent ia l Benef i t 
Costs was mailed to the address requested by the employer and the employer has 
f a i l e d to show that the delay in f i l i n g a wr i t t en request was due to circumstances 
beyond h is control or due to circumstances which were reasonable and compel l ing. 
I t i s noted when the employer withdrew his appeal from an audit determinat ion, he 
was given another opportunity to request r e l i e f of charges and knew or should have 
known tha t t h i s request would be forthcoming. Yet the employer f a i l e d to act upon 
the request 1n a t imely manner. I t must be held that the employer f a i l e d without 
good cause tc f i l e a t imely request f o r r e l i e f of charges,. 
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In the event the Department finds as a result of their Investigation that the 
claimant has received benefits to which she was not ent i t led and establishes 
an overpayment, the employer wi l l be relieved of benefit costs associated with 
those benefits. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Department Representative which held* the employer l iable 
for their pro-rated share of benefits paid to Kathryn F. Preece in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act is herewith affirmed. 
S t a n l e y . Griff 1M/ 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision wil l become final unless within ten days from March 6 1986, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review ( P . O . Box 11600, Salt Lake 
Ci ty , Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
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cc: BPC 
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iHOYlK HOTICt Of CUUt* WJD JiO 
•onirriAL mmtrn COSTS f mpMvflM/tr I 
C L A I M * M I > i » • * * 
S,x St i I ,tf ' 1 p 
EMF'I HfER A U I I ;-08i646~l 
h, Andrew M&^allough 
$30 South Suit* ST t'O 
Or*rr Utah 840SS 
BAH 
i l l lJ 1L * 
BASE PERIOD 07-C1 »i 
BASE PERIOO WAGES 
FROM THIS EMPLOYER 
Qtr 1/84 Uit 
Qtr 4/84 1*41 
Qtr 1/81 41 SO 
Qtr */te *3t* 
TOTAL #241*1 
FROM ALL 
Pr fl>-86 
EMPLOYERS fM#* ' * 
POTENTIAL BENEFIT COSTS 
FOR THIS EMPLOYER 4 ifii I 
FOR ALL EMPLOYERS $ 8S*t.Q0 
The above named claimant hat Nleilac ta MI liv unemployment insurance benefits and reports you were hto/her employer during 
tr a base penod shown 
THE CLAIMANT REPORTS TBE REASON FOR SSPAJRATIO* AS FltSV 
Thla is an official notice that your pro fata snare et any benefits paid to f>0e oaatwawl w* be Included to f * <ttMrmliie*taft of yeot 
benefit ratio tax rate for calendar year* beginning In 19S&. uolee* you pa*e>e*d eritfcsn ten p OJ stays. ReMcffttaeahavBetrnv 
be oranted under conditions aa outlined on the reverse aide *t H»u •—*• • - - - « • • •• •• • - — 
charges and there Is no need to respond You may also protest m 
that the claimant does not meet other eligibility requirements. _ — *2 
If you feel you qualify for relief oi charges your request for reeef n 
discharged, give causes for your action.) Missing, incomplete, or tnc 
rate and/or improper payment of benefits. 
ACTION REQUESTED BY EMPLOYER: (Ptosse check appro, 
U Reite^ of charges to benefit ratio tax rate, (please fumieh factual separation kitormat* / 
GIVE 
TO THE i ^ ~ 
IMARHH OF HIM 
'i <* 
W** A . T Review of clan M I •• i ijlbllllj hu n i fa* JII ii if or matton provided below 
D Cortex hon of Uiaiyea. 
D Claimant not employed by this firm, (pieaee provide correct #n pk>yer H known*. 
I I Bus* period earnings ire incorrect A correct Quarterly hieppMmrn nl iwyni ln rrr k1wJ 4 i * 
k rj / / ^ 
Plea*P indii ad i I In *t '*±±1?*+ ?>±£L spr±. / J^jfeJ IAAJL^^ f<*** '- /^/MJACL-/ 
t^ /.1-T Li***/ /JLIS,\ S)JL. ^kA.is iiJL'*. 
If addteonai apace la needed, attach a letter You may attach any 
Relief e»n NOT be granted unless your 
naqueet is submitted m writing b, 12-28-85 dl 
Y«« x t tb* notified of the Depertm m i » ileoiaion wtth regaU 
to any i 
Teat*? hone Homh* 
i n 11 m A i >i BI M vkifM I II I 1 I i 
»iic»«*ra»5^isMo»'»*oiBhf^ 
' Ly O^ '/ Signetur* 
H^l-*/-
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W.ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, JENSEN & IVINS 
Attorneys for Employer 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84056 
Telephone: 224-2119 
IN THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
In re KATHRYN F. PREECE AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 86-BR-104-C 
oooOooo 
MeCULLOUOH, 
tOHM • JINSCN 
130 South Stiti Si 
Suit* 10 
Oram UUh 64056 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WTH*i ) 
RUSTY J. HANNA, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is the president and the general manager of Mini 
Spas, Inc. 
2. That, sometime in December of 1985, a form 607, Employer 
Notice of Claim Filed and Potential Benefit Costs, was received by 
his office, from his attorney, W. Andrew McCullough. 
3. That he was unaware of any such Notice until January, 
1986, after the period of time for requesting to file that form 
had expired. 
4. That he only became aware of the existence of that 
document when his attorney asked him whether he had sent it in. 
5. That, upon the reminder of his attorney, he searched anc 
found the document, which he had not previously seen, and filed it 
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| p r o m p t l y . 
j 6. I l i I I I i t< I h» mi p h+> Uaf* good cause, to obiect to the 
; g r a n t i n g o i b e n e f i t s t o C l a i m a n t h e i e i n , a s tie h a s gooa r e a s o n t o 
i b e l i e v e t h n t C l a i m a n t , w h i l e on t h t p i e n s e s o± Hii'i . t ) *i r Tm 
I arid wi :t :t 3 * Hmpluynij m I he s e r v i c e ol Mini h p a s p I n c . , e n g a g e d in 
| d r ug t r a f f i c ! n q and a r t s ni p r o s t i t u t i o n . 
j l\ Thai he
 ttxso ^ a 6 good r e G S O n t o hi- l innm t h -i t F IMHI 
j 
j b e i n g s a p o i o L e d 1 i o» e m p l o y m e n t w i t h t h i s Empioye j , i 1 o j m o n I went-
] *to work fo i Anat.oiii) mud IIM H e a l t h S t u d i o , l o c a t e d on S o u t h Main 
S t r e e t I n S o u t h S a l t L a k e , Utah "iiiiil ' <"w I in I I y n " in |" I y n l I h e i * , 
a l t h o u g h n o t on t h e r e c o r d s ol t h a t e s t a b l i s h m e n t , due t o an 
i l l e g a . 1 a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n C l a i m a n t and Anatomy ^^d ^B t ^ a * she 
w o u l d n o t b e c o u n t e r l n M n ni i " in ( 1 1 n i \ Lin nu 11 I I "i 1 M 11 f 11 I 11 imi >\i! i 1111*- I i 
r e c e i v e u n e m p l o y m e n t i r i s u i a i i c e • 
H F'hat. he h a s a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e <if t h e nbovf a 1 "1 e a a t l one 
a n d a f t e in 111 »- 11 I i 111 i i ! 111 II I i ! l ir i ! i (i i I i i n I II I  i 11J JII i i J i L L a L i " t i, a". 
Judge without success. 
i I I in ml In l i e l i e v e i h i e f a i l u r e 3 t o f i l e t h e p n p f r t w i t h i n 
t h e t e n MI I I I | I e i i t \ \ i i <-j 111 HJ F HI P I I II I I I I I I I I ' < | IM I I ni < 11 m \ 11 m i i i uq 11 11 
fault o± his own, and was excusable neglect, within the terms of 
4P» the law. 
DA ITU 1 I, I P „.^S5JC2?__„ 
JCULLOUOH 
tCt A JfNSEN 
South Stat© St 
Suits 10 
TV Utah 84068 
f ./6ZL2&2J-- . 19S6 
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McCULLOUOH, 
5NES ft JENSEN 
10 South Sttt* St 
Suit. 10 
T*m. Utah 64058 
Subscribed and Sworn before me th 
. 1986. 
« .32. a day of 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: ///ft?&*} 
Residing at: ^ ^ * w 7 //If 
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